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Abstract
Fairness considerations fundamentally affect human behavior, but our
understanding of the nature and development of people’s fairness prefer-
ences is limited. The dictator game has been the standard experimental de-
sign for studying fairness preferences, but it only captures a situation where
there is broad agreement that fairness requires equal split. In real life, peo-
ple often disagree on what is fair, largely because they disagree on whether
individual achievements, luck, and efficiency considerations of what maxi-
mizes total benefits, can justify inequalities. We modified the dictator game
to capture these elements, and studied how inequality acceptance develops
in adolescence. We found as children enter adolescence, they increasingly
viewed inequalities reflecting differences in individual achievements, but not
luck, fair, whereas efficiency considerations mainly played a role in late ado-
lescence.
JEL code: D63
It is well documented that adult humans are motivated by fairness consider-
ations and are willing to sacrifice personal gains in order to eliminate inequali-
ties they view as unfair (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Camerer, 2003). It is also evident
from the political debate, surveys (Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Gaertner and
Schwettmann, 2007), and economic experiments (Konow, 2000; Frohlich et al.,
2004; Cappelen et al., 2007) that most adults view some inequalities as fair. In par-
ticular, most adults believe that differences in individual achievements (Konow,
2000; Cherry et al., 2002; Frohlich et al., 2004; Cappelen et al., 2007) and ef-
ficiency considerations of what maximizes total benefits (Van Lange, 1999; An-
dreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007) may justify an unequal distribution
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of income, but disagree on whether inequalities reflecting luck are fair (Cappelen
et al., 2010, 2007).
To illustrate how efficiency and individual achievements may justify an un-
equal distribution of resources, consider two children, Anne and Carla, who dis-
cuss how to divide a cake. Anne appeals to efficiency when she argues that total
benefits are maximized by giving her the largest share because she enjoys cake the
most. Carla appeals to individual achievements when she argues that she should
get the largest share because her contribution to making the cake was largest. The
legitimacy of these, and other, fairness considerations have been extensively dis-
cussed in the philosophical literature (Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974; Sen, 2009), and
such considerations are important for how people make decisions in a wide range
of situations (Montada, 2002). For example, in the workplace, some may find it
fair that a more productive colleague has a higher wage, and, in allocating public
funds, some may find it fair to pay some attention to which projects produce the
greatest total benefits in the population.
Disagreements over questions of fair distribution are fundamental in human
life and to get a better understanding of the source of such disagreements it is im-
portant to study how fairness views develop in childhood (Moore et al., 1993).
The development of children’s fairness views has been extensively studied in
the psychological literature (Piaget, 1965; Damon, 1977; Hook and Cook, 1979;
Kohlberg, 1984; Gilligan, 1982; Eisenberg et al., 1995) and also, more recently,
in behavioral economics (Benenson et al., 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Sutter
and Kocher, 2007; Sutter, 2007; Fehr et al., 2008). It has been shown that young
children with age tend to become less selfish in their reasoning (Piaget, 1965; Da-
mon, 1977; Kohlberg, 1984; Eisenberg et al., 1995) and choices (Hook and Cook,
1979; Benenson et al., 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008), while the
evidence for adolescents is more mixed (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Harbaugh et al.,
2007; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Sutter, 2007; Gummerum et al., 2008), and that
they tend to move from a strict egalitarian view towards fairness views taking into
account individual contributions and circumstances (Piaget, 1965; Mikula, 1972;
Damon, 1977; Hook and Cook, 1979; Kohlberg, 1984; Moore et al., 1993).
There has, however, been little research on the development of two important
characteristics of adults’ distributive behavior, namely that they distinguish be-
tween achievements and luck (Cappelen et al., 2010, 2007) and take efficiency
considerations into account (Van Lange, 1999; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fis-
man et al., 2007). To study the development of these features, we conducted
a computer-based experiment that employed two versions of the dictator game.
In the dictator game, the dictator is assigned an amount of money to distribute
between him- or herself and another person, and the total income of the two par-
ticipants is unaffected by how the money is distributed. In such a situation, there
is no apparent fairness argument justifying an unequal split. In the first part of the
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experiment, we modified this design by introducing a production phase, such that
the money to be distributed was earned and depended on individual achievements
and luck. In the second part of the experiment, the dictator was given a number
of points to distribute, and the distribution of points determined the income for
each of the two participants. To introduce efficiency considerations, we made the
points most valuable for the other participant, so that the dictator could maximize
the total income of the two by giving away all the points.
The framework for our analysis assumes that children make a trade-off be-
tween two primary motives in their distributive choices, self-interest and fairness,
and that they may differ both in their level of self-interest and in what they consid-
ered fair. By observing how the children chose in a series of different situations in
each part of the experiment, where the different fairness views to a varying degree
justified giving money to the other participant, we established the importance of
each of the fairness views at the different grade levels.
Before they started the first part of the experiment, the participants were given
complete information about both the production phase and the distribution phase.
The production phase lasted 45 minutes, and the participants could move between
two web sites. At a production site the participants could collect points by ticking
off every appearance of a particular number on a sequence of screens filled with
different three-digit numbers. At an entertainment site, the participants could view
short videos or pictures, read cartoons, or play computer games. The participants
decided how much time they wanted to spend on each of the two sites. Most
participants worked all the time on the production site (average time, 42 minutes),
but this design made salient that production was the result of individual ability
and choice of effort. After the production phase, the computer calculated how
many points each participant had collected. The participants were then randomly
assigned either a high price per point of 0.40 NOK (approximately 0.08 USD) or a
low price per point of 0.20 NOK. This design introduced a distinction between two
sources of inequality in earnings: production, reflecting individual achievements,
and earnings, partly reflecting luck in the random draw of prices.
In the distribution phase, the participants were randomly matched in a se-
quence of pairs with participants at the same grade level. For each pair, the par-
ticipants were given information about the time spent on the production site, the
number of points collected, the price, and the earnings, and then asked to choose
how much of the total income (the sum of individual earnings for the pair) to take
for themselves. Since average production increased with age, the average income
to be distributed in each pair also increased with age (Table S4).
The mean share given to the other participant in the first part of the experi-
ment was very high, close to 45 percent for the whole sample, and there was no
statistically significant difference in mean share given between 5th graders and
13th graders (Table 1A, t-test, unequal variance, p=0.460 (males) and p=0.179
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(females)). Hence, we did not find any evidence of a change in selfishness from
mid-childhood to late adolescence. Moreover, we did not find any statistically
differences in self-interest between males and females (Table 1A, t-test, unequal
variance, p=0.481 (5th grade), p=0.438 (7th grade), p=0.621 (9th grade), p=0.996
(11th grade), and p=0.330 (13th grade)).
We did, however, observe an increase in the acceptance of inequalities reflect-
ing differences in production. The coefficient for share produced by the other par-
ticipant in a regression of share given showed that older participants were much
more likely to differentiate on the basis of individual achievements (Figure 1A).
The sharpest increase in the coefficient occurred from 5th grade to 7th grade,
but there was also a further increase from 7th grade to 13th grade. There was a
statistically significant difference between 5th grade and all other grades in the
coefficient for share produced (multiple Wald tests of equality with Bonferroni
adjustments, p=0.001 (7th grade), p=0.001 (9th grade), p=0.025 (11th grade),
and p<0.001 (13th grade)), and between 7th grade and 13th grade (Wald test,
p=0.034). We observed the same developmental pattern for both males and fe-
males; there were no statistically significant gender differences in the coefficient
for share produced (Wald test, p=0.980 (5th grade), p=0.949 (7th grade), p=0.534
(9th grade), p=0.571 (11th grade), and p=0.214 (13th grade)). The coefficient for
the relative price was also statistically significant different from zero, but stable
across grade levels and gender.
To further understand the importance of production and price in explaining the
observed behavior, we estimated a model of individual choices that captured the
basic assumptions of our theoretical framework and allowed for some random-
ness in the participants’ choices. Specifically, for each grade level, we estimated
a distribution of the weight attached to fairness and the share of participants mo-
tivated by different fairness views. Informed by normative theory and our own
previous work (Cappelen et al., 2010, 2007), we assumed that there were three
salient fairness views in this situation: strict egalitarianism (Rawls, 1971), finding
all inequalities unfair; meritocratism (Arrow et al., 2000), justifying inequalities
reflecting differences in production; and libertarianism (Nozick, 1974), justifying
all inequalities in earnings.
We found striking differences in the prevalence of fairness views between the
grade levels (Table 2). The large majority of 5th graders were strict egalitarians,
and, remarkably, there were almost no meritocrats at this grade level. In contrast,
meritocratism was the dominant position in late adolescence, and the share of
strict egalitarians fell dramatically. The share of libertarians was stable across
grade levels. In sum, this analysis showed that individual achievements, measured
by production, became increasingly important with age, whereas there was no
similar developmental trend in the importance of luck, measured by the price.
The estimated model also confirmed our finding of no change in selfishness
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Table 2: Estimates of choice model
Grade level
5th 7th 9th 11th 13th all
share of egalitarians 0.636 0.401 0.272 0.267 0.224 0.365
(0.060) (0.059) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.027)
share of meritocrats 0.054 0.220 0.363 0.396 0.428 0.287
(0.037) (0.054) (0.063) (0.069) (0.075) (0.028)
share of libertarians 0.310 0.379 0.364 0.337 0.347 0.348
(0.057) (0.055) (0.061) (0.059) (0.069) (0.026)
Log likelihood −827.4 −881.4 −797.6 −865.0 −790.3 −4219.7
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, complete set of estimates in Table S3.
from mid-childhood to late adolescence; the estimated median weight attached
to self-interest was stable across grade levels (Table S3). Overall, the estimated
model fit the data well for all grade levels (Figure S1).
In the second part of the experiment we studied inequality acceptance in situ-
ations involving efficiency considerations. The participants were given the task of
distributing a number of points, where total benefits, in terms of income, would
be maximized by giving all the points to the other participant. Specifically, the
participants were informed that he or she would receive 1 NOK for each point
kept for him- or herself, whereas each point given to the other participant would
earn him or her 1 NOK scaled up by a multiplier. They made choices in four
distributional situations, presented in random order, where the multiplier was 1
(the baseline), 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Hence, efficiency considerations did not
play any role in the baseline situation, but were increasingly salient in the other
three situations. In each situation, the participants were randomly paired with an-
other participants at the same grade level. For comparability, we set the number of
points to be distributed such that the average income in the baseline situation was
equal to the session-specific average income in the first part of the experiment.
We observed that 5th graders and 7th graders did not assign much importance
to efficiency considerations; share given was only slightly higher when the points
transferred were scaled up by four than in the baseline situation (Table 1B). In
contrast, the effect of the multiplier was substantial for males in late adolescence
and also noticeable for females in 13th grade. These patterns are reflected in the
coefficient for the multiplier in a regression of share given (Figure 1B). There was
a statistically significant increase in the coefficient from 5th grade to 13th grade
for both males and females (Wald test, p=0.003 (males) and p=0.019 (females)),
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which reflects that older participants were more likely to differentiate on the basis
of efficiency considerations. This development, however, took place later in ado-
lescence than the differentiation on the basis of individual achievements. More-
over, we observed a statistically significant difference between males and females
from 9th grade, where efficiency considerations played a more important role for
males than females (Wald test, p=0.316 (5th grade), p=0.152 (7th grade), p=0.005
(9th grade), p< 0.001 (11th grade), and p=0.060 (13th grade)).
Our analysis showed that children’s level of self-interest was stable across
adolescence, whereas their fairness views changed fundamentally in the same pe-
riod. In particular, we found increased importance of the meritocratic fairness
view, which requires a distinction between different sources of inequality. Inter-
estingly, however, we did not observe a uniform move away from the two less
complex fairness views. While there was a sharp decrease in the importance of
the strict egalitarian fairness view, the prevalence of the libertarian fairness view
was stable throughout adolescence. These findings shed some light on the role
of both cognitive maturation and social experiences in shaping children’s fairness
preferences. The meritocratic fairness view presupposes the ability to distinguish
between relevant and irrelevant information, a cognitive ability that matures dur-
ing adolescence (Steinberg, 2005), which may partly explain why we observed
increased prevalence of this view. The strict egalitarian and libertarian fairness
view, however, are straightforward to implement, and thus the different develop-
ment of these two fairness views is hard to explain by cognitive maturation. This
suggests that social experiences also play a role in shaping children’s fairness
preferences.
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1 Regressions
We here report the details of the regressions presented in Figure 1 in the main paper.
Grade level 5th 7th 9th 11th 13th
Share produced 0.408 0.647 0.667 0.613 0.794
(0.052) (0.043) (0.046) (0.061) (0.048)
Relative price 0.067 0.074 0.072 0.079 0.072
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Constant 0.148 0.052 0.048 0.038 -0.013
(0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028)
R-squared 0.196 0.387 0.425 0.318 0.485
Number of observations 504 530 452 468 408
Table 1: Regression of share given on share produced and relative price for the first part of
the experiment - Panel A in Figure 1. Share given is defined as the other participant’s share of
total income. The explanatory variables in this regression are share produced (defined as share
of total points produced), the relative price (defined as the participant’s own price divided by the
other participant’s price), and personal fixed effects. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
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2 Choice model
We here present the details of the choice model used to estimate the share of strict egalitarians,
meritocrats and libertarians, presented in Table 2 in the main paper.
We assume that individual i makes a trade-off between self-interest and fairness in his
choices, which is captured by the following utility function,
V
k(i)
i (y; ·) = y − βi
(y −mk(i))2
2X
, (1)
where y is what individual i keeps for himself, mk(i) is what he considers fair to keep, βi is the
weight he assigns to fairness, and X is the total income to be distributed.
We assume that individual i endorses a strict egalitarian ideal (mE), a meritocratic ideal
(mM ) or a libertarian ideal (mL).
mE(i) = X/2, (2a)
mM(i) =
ai
ai + aj
X, (2b)
mL(i) =
aipi
aipi + ajpj
X, (2c)
where ai is the production and piai the earnings of individual i.
To handle deviations from the interior solution, we use a random utility framework (1),
where total utility is assumed to be the sum of a deterministic part (in our context, V ) and a
random part that is specific to each alternative in the choice set Y . Total utility is then given by,
Ui(y; ·) = V k(i)i (y; ·) + εiy/γ for all y ∈ Y , (3)
where γ captures the importance of the random part, and the individual choice is given by the
argument that maximizes Ui on Y . We make the standard assumption that the ε is an i.i.d.
extreme value variate, which gives rise to choice probabilities of the simple logit form.
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In formulating the likelihood function, we need to take into account that the fairness ide-
als, mk(i), and the weight attached to fairness, βi, are unobserved characteristics of the indi-
vidual. We approximate the distribution of β with a lognormal distribution, where the dis-
tribution is parameterized such that log β ∼ N(µβ, σβ). Moreover, we let λE , λM , and λL
represent the estimated shares of the population acting on the egalitarian, meritocratic, and lib-
ertarian fairness ideals, respectively. In sum, all parameters to be estimated are contained in
θ = (µβ, σ
2
β, γ, λ
E, λM , λL).
To capture that we have repeated observations of each individual, let s = 1, . . . , Si index
the distributive situations where individual i makes a choice. In each, (yis,Ys,as,ps) are the
observable variables; yis is the amount of money i takes for himself in s; Ys = {0, 10, . . . ,ps ·
as} is the set of all possible choices i could make in s; as and ps are the vectors representing the
production and the prices of the two individuals matched in s. We can now state the likelihood
contribution of an individual i as,
Li(θ) =
∑
k∈{E,M,L}
λk
∫ [ Si∏
s=1
exp
(
γV k(yis,as,ps, β, )
)∑
t∈Ys exp (γV
k(t,as,ps, β))
× f(β;µβ, σβ)
]
dβ, (4)
where f(β;µβ, σβ) is the density of β.
Table 3 in this appendix reports all estimates for this model.
Figure 1 in this appendix provides a comparison of the predicted distribution of the share
given to others with the actual distribution, and we observe that the model fits nicely the data
for all grade levels
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Table 3: Estimates of choice model
Grade level
5th 7th 9th 11th 13th all
λE , share of egalitarians 0.636 0.401 0.272 0.267 0.224 0.365
(0.060) (0.059) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.027)
λM , share of meritocrats 0.054 0.220 0.363 0.396 0.428 0.287
(0.037) (0.054) (0.063) (0.069) (0.075) (0.028)
λL, share of libertarians 0.310 0.379 0.364 0.337 0.347 0.348
(0.057) (0.055) (0.061) (0.059) (0.069) (0.026)
µβ , mean of log β 4.154 4.426 4.049 4.064 4.901 4.258
(0.286) (0.185) (0.186) (0.237) (0.294) (0.102)
σβ , standard deviation of log β 2.552 1.540 1.334 2.137 2.199 1.970
(0.272) (0.143) (0.121) (0.208) (0.197) (0.072)
γ, inverse weight on random term 2.785 3.320 3.415 3.236 1.106 2.485
(0.184) (0.399) (0.481) (0.337) (0.074) (0.061)
Log likelihood −827.4 −881.4 −797.6 −865.0 −790.3 −4219.7
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using the BHHH method (2). One of the
estimated population shares and its standard error are calculated residually. The likelihood is
maximized using the FmOpt library (3). A likelihood ratio test of the restriction imposed by
a common set of parameters for all grades (the last column) has a χ220 = 116.0, which means
the common parameter specification can be rejected at all reasonable levels of significance
(p < 0.001).
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Figure 1: The distribution of outcomes and predictions
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Note: Predictions made at the distuations in the dataset, using the estimates of Table 3. The
dark line represents the cumulative distribution function of data, the light gray line that of the
predictions.
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3 Methodology
We recruited a total of 486 children from schools in Bergen municipality in Norway, by ran-
domly selecting 20 schools and then randomly selecting children at the different grade levels
within these schools. The 5th, 7th, and 9th grades are compulsory in Norway, and more than 90
percent of children also continue to high school. At high school, some programs end at the 12th
grade. To ensure balanced recruitment across programs, we therefore selected pupils from both
12th and 13th grades (but refer to this, for short, as the 13th grade in the main paper). Bergen
municipality, which includes the second largest city in Norway as well as less populated rural
farming areas, is close to the national average with respect to the distribution of income, educa-
tion and occupation. Hence, the selected sample is fairly representative for children in these age
groups in Norway. The invitation to participate was accepted by 63.6 percent of the children,
where children below the age of 16 needed written consent from their parents to participate.
A total of 10 sessions were conducted in two computer labs at the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration and no teachers were present during the experiment.
Each session only had participants from the same grade level, a fact that was known to all
participants. To avoid any in-group effects we never had more than five participants from the
same class in any lab.
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were given a description of how the
experiment would proceed. All interaction between the participants was anonymous and con-
ducted through a web-based interface. The experiment was double blind, i.e., neither subjects
nor experimenters could link decisions with particular subjects. A copy of the instructions is
provided in a separate appendix.
In total, the participants made 2 362 distributional choices in the first part of the experiment
and 1 868 in the second part of the experiment. The participants were not informed about
8
the actual payment from the experiment before both parts of the experiment were completed.
The payment for each part of the experiment was determined by randomly choosing one of the
situations that the person had been involved in. The average payment from the experiment was
182 NOK (approximately 35 USD).
At the end of the experiment, the participants were given a code and a claim form. This form
was placed in an envelope addressed to the accounting division at our school. The procedure
ensured that neither the participants nor the research team were in a position to identify how
much each participant earned in the experiment.
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Appendix: Introduction and Screenshots 
 
Welcome to NHH. My name is xx and I will be leading this experiment.   
 
The results from this experiment will be used in a research project. In order for us to be able 
to use the results, it is important that all of you who participate keep to the rules that have 
been handed out. Let me repeat the rules: 
 
• You are not allowed to talk to other participants during the experiment 
• If you have any questions or problems during the experiment, then please raise your 
hand and we will come and help you. We cannot answer any questions in plenary. 
Since this is a research project, this is very important. You must sit quietly with your 
hand raised and wait until we come over and help you 
• All mobile phones must be switched off 
• You are not allowed to open any other internet pages than the one we ask you to open 
• If you break any of these rules, you will have to leave the room and will not be 
allowed to participate in the experiment 
 
I am now going to tell you a bit about the experiment. While I do that, you must not touch the 
keyboard until you are told to do so. 
 
The experiment will be carried out simultaneously in two different rooms. Some of the people 
who came here on the bus with you were sent to this room, while others were sent to another 
similar room. The others will receive exactly the same information and do exactly the same 
things as you will be doing. 
 
The experiment is anonymous. This means that you will not be asked to tell us who you are. It 
also means that it will not be possible for us or for the other participants to find out what you 
are doing during the experiment. 
 
This experiment is in two parts. In the first part you have 45 minutes in which you decide 
yourself what you want to do.  You can either choose a closed games page with games, 
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cartoons, nice pictures and videos. Alternatively you can choose another closed page, where 
you will be asked to solve a task. On the task page you will be able to make money. 
 
After 45 minutes both the games page and the task page will no longer be available. You will 
then be told the total number of points you have earned on the task page and how much these 
are worth. For half of you, one point on the task page will be worth 40 øre, while for the rest 
of you one point on the task page will be worth 20 øre. How much your points will be worth, 
is determined randomly by the computer that controls the experiment. 
 
So what happens to the money you have earned on the task page? When you have completed 
the task, you will be linked to another participant via the internet. You will not be told who 
the other person is. It may be someone in this room, or someone in the other room. Between 
you, you will earn a sum of money, and you are going to choose how much you think you 
should receive. The remainder is what you think the other person should receive. When you 
decide on the division, you will be told how long each of you has worked on the task. The 
other person will also choose how much money you will receive and how much the other 
person will give to him or herself. These choices will decide how much money you will be 
bringing home with you when you leave. You will receive more information about how this 
will be done after you have played games and worked on the task. 
 
Part II of the experiment does not have anything to do with part I, so I will not tell you about 
part II until we have completed part I. 
 
We are soon going to start part I of the experiment and I will explain how you can earn points 
on the task page. 
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Part I 
The task page 
Here is an example of the type of task you will be given on the task page. 
 
Screen Shot 1 
Task 
You have earned a total of 6 points. 
Find all the places where the number 743 appears in the table. 
Click in the box on the right-hand side of these numbers. 
You earn one point for each correct number 
You lose one point for each wrong number 
When you wish to continue to the next task, click the submit button underneath the table 
SUBMIT 
 
• On the task page there is a table with numbers 
• Your task is to find a particular number, for example the number XX 
• The number may be found several places in the table and you must click on the right-
hand side of the number every time you find it 
• You will earn one point for each correct number you have ticked off 
• You will lose one point if you tick off a different number from the one you have been 
asked to tick off 
• When you cannot find any more numbers of this type or are tired of looking for this 
number, then press SUBMIT. 
 
A new table will then appear and you will be asked to find a new number. And this is how it 
continues. Each time you submit a table the machine will count and register your points. At 
the top of the page you can check the number of points you have earned. 
 
The other page is a closed games page that will also only be available to you during these 45 
minutes. This page is underneath the one that is open now. You may now open the games 
page but you are not allowed to do anything before I say so. 
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Screen shot 2 
ENTERTAINMENT 
Welcome to the entertainment page. Here you can choose between different types of 
entertainment by clicking on the links below. Remember that you can go back to the page 
where you are earning points at any time. 
Computer Games Funny Commercials Pondus Fantastic Pictures The Art of 
Sharing 
 
Here you see a copy of the main page on the games page. It consists of four parts: 
• Twelve different games such as Tetrix, Pexcon, Snowboard Stunts and Helicopter  
• Commercials for Playstation, iPod, Adidas and others 
• Pondus cartoons 
• A series of beautiful nature pictures 
 
It is up to you how much time you want to spend on the games page and how much time you 
want to spend on the task page during the 45 minutes the two pages are open. After 45 
minutes both pages will be closed and you will no longer be able to play on the games page or 
work on the task page. 
 
You can easily move between the two pages, and we are now going to show you how this 
works. First, everyone goes to the games page. 
 
Here, you see the 12 games that are available. Everyone starts by playing “Helicopter”. 
 
You are now going to choose another game. In order to choose another game, click on “Main 
page” in the top left-hand corner of the screen, choose “Computer game” and then choose the 
game that you would like to try. 
 
Now return to the main page on the games page. Now try to go to the task page and then back 
to the games page. When you get back to the games page, click on “Funny commercials”. 
You are not allowed to start any of the commercials yet. 
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We have now finished with the introduction and are ready to start. Remember that you can 
ask questions at any time by raising your hand. We now have to wait a little while for the 
computer that controls the experiment and both rooms to be ready to start the experiment. 
 
You may now start doing what you like on the games page. If you want to hear the sound on 
the videos and games, you must use the ear phones. 
 
Now it is also possible to go to the task page and earn points. You may move backwards and 
forwards between these two pages as you wish. 
 
It is now 20/10/1 minute(s) left before we close the games page and the task page. 
 
It is now 20 seconds left and everyone must press SUBMIT before the time is up. When the 
time is up, it will not be possible to register any more tables. 
 
The time is now up, and everyone must press SUBMIT to go to the next page. Our assistants 
will now come round and close the games page. You are not allowed to open it again. 
 
I am now going to explain the next phase of the experiment, so everyone must sit still and 
listen to what I am saying. You will now be starting the division phase. The first page you are 
going to see in the division phase is a page that shows you how many points you have earned 
on the task page. Here is an example of what this page may look like. 
 
Screen shot 3 
Result: 
You worked with the task for 32 minutes. 
You earned 250 points. 
You were unlucky and get 0.20 krone for each point. 
Your points are worth 50 kroner. 
Press the button to continue: 
CONTINUE 
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This page tells you: 
• How long you have worked with the task 
• How many points you have earned 
• Whether you were lucky and earned 40 øre per point or unlucky and earned 20 øre per 
point 
• And on the last line you will see the total value of your points 
 
When you have finished reading this page, you move on to the first choice that you need to 
make. Here is an example of such a choice situation: 
 
Screen shot 4 
Choice 1/5 
Together with another participant you have earned a total of 170 kroner. 
How much of this do you wish to give to yourself? 
(The amount will be rounded off to the nearest 10 kroner.) 
How did you earn the money? 
 
YOU     THE OTHER PARTICIPANT 
Worked for 32 minutes  Worked for 36 minutes 
Earned 250 points   Earned 300 points 
Were unlucky (20 øre per point) Were lucky (40 øre per point) 
Earned 50 kroner   Earned 120 kroner 
 
What you are going to decide, is how much you want to give to yourself. In each situation you 
will be linked to another pupil, either in this room or in the other room. You will be told: 
• how many minutes the other person worked with the task 
• how many points the other person earned 
• whether he or she was lucky or unlucky 
• and, at the bottom, the total value of the other person’s points 
You will also receive the same information about yourself. 
 
What you are going to do is to decide how much of your joint earnings you want to give to 
yourself. The other person will receive the rest. 
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When you have made your choice in this situation, a new page that shows your choice will 
come up. It looks like this: 
 
Screen shot 5 
Confirmation 
Choice 1/5 
Together with another participant you have earned a total of 170 kroner. 
You chose to keep xxx kroner yourself. 
This means that the other participant gets xxx kroner. 
 
How did you earn the money? 
 
YOU     THE OTHER PARTICIPANT 
Worked for 32 minutes  Worked for 36 minutes 
Earned 250 points   Earned 300 points 
Were unlucky (20 øre per point) Were lucky (40 øre per point) 
Earned 50 kroner   Earned 120 kroner 
Press the button to confirm your choice or try again 
CONFIRM 
TRY AGAIN 
 
This page tells you how much you have decided to give to yourself and to the other person. 
 
If you are happy with your choice, press CONFIRM CHOICE. If you wish to change your 
decision, press TRY AGAIN. 
 
When you have confirmed your choice in the first situation, you will come to a new situation. 
Here, you will receive information about another pupil who is taking part in the experiment 
and about how much you have earned together. Here you must also decide how much you 
want to give to yourself. 
 
You may get questions about up to 5 such situations. 
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It is very important that you think of all your choices as real, because it may be one of these 
choices that decides how much you and another participant will earn from part I here today. 
At the end of the experiment, the computer that controls the experiment will randomly pick 
out one of the situations where you have made a choice. In the chosen situation the computer 
will randomly pick either your choice or the choice of the other participant. The choice that is 
picked out, whether it is yours or that of the other person, will decide how much you will 
actually earn in this part of the experiment. 
 
Don’t be afraid to make mistakes when you make your choices. Firstly, you will see 
immediately what you have chosen and will be asked if your choice is ok. In addition, when 
you have made all your choices, you will get an overview of all the situations. If there are any 
choices that you are not happy with, then you can make them again. If you are happy with all 
your choices, then you confirm them. 
 
If you find some of this difficult, you can just raise your hand and we will come and help you. 
 
One thing is very important: you must work with your choices right until you reach this page. 
 
Screen shot 6 
You have now completed the first part of the experiment 
Wait for new instructions. 
 
When you have come this far, you have completed part I. Please sit quietly and wait until 
everyone has reached this page. 
 
We now have to wait a little while for the computer that controls the experiment and both 
rooms to be ready. 
 
We are now ready to start with the division. First, you will see the results from your work 
with the task. When you have finished looking at this, you continue and start by making your 
first choice. Remember to raise your hand if you need help. And remember to continue until 
you reach the screen shot that shows that you have finished the first part of the experiment. 
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Now everyone has done a good job and has completed the first part of the experiment. We 
will not tell you how much you have earned in the first part before the whole experiment is 
completed, but what happens next will not affect the payment you receive for part I. And what 
you have done in part I will not affect what happens in part II. 
 
We are now ready for part II. I will first explain what is going to happen, so please do not 
continue until you are told to do so. 
 
Part II 
In part II of the experiment you will be making choices in some new situations. You will 
receive a number of points without having to earn them by doing tasks. These points you may 
keep for yourself or give to someone else. 
 
The first page you come to will tell you how many points you have received. When you have 
looked at it, you continue to the first choice where you will be linked to someone either in this 
room or in the other room.  
 
I am now going to show you an example of such a choice. 
 
Screen shot 7 
Division Choice 1/1 
You have received 50 points and must decide how many you wish to keep for yourself.  
                      YOU  THE OTHER PARTICIPANT 
Value per point (kr) 1  1 
How many points out of the 50 do you want to keep for yourself? SUBMIT DECISION 
(The machine will round off to the nearest 25 points.) 
 
Here you will see: 
• How many points you have to divide 
• How much the points are worth to you and how much they are worth to the other 
person 
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Let me explain the last point in more detail. It will always be the case that if you keep 1 point 
for yourself, then it will be worth 1 krone to you, which means that you will receive 1 krone. 
This is what it means when it says in the table that value per point for you is 1 krone. 
 
But you can also choose to give the point to the other participant. It is the same as giving the 
other person money, but how much money the other person will receive for the point will vary 
and can seen from the table. If it says that value per point for the other person is 1 krone, then 
it means that the other person will receive 1 krone when you give him or her 1 point. But in 
some situations it will say that the value per point for the other person is 2 kroner, 3 kroner or 
4 kroner. If it says 4 kroner, that means that if you give him or her 1 point, then he or she will 
receive 4 kroner. So that in such a situation the points are worth more to the other person than 
to you. You give away 1 point that is worth 1 krone to you, the other person receives 1 point 
that is worth 4 kroner to him or her, and, correspondingly, if it says 2 or 3 kroner in this part 
of the table. 
 
You may get questions about up to 4 such situations. 
 
As in part I it is very important that you think of all your choices as real, because it may be 
one of these choices that will determine how much you and another participant are going to 
earn from part II here today. At the end of the experiment the computer that controls the 
experiment will randomly pick out one of the situations where you have made a choice. In the 
chosen situation the computer will randomly pick out either your choice or the choice of the 
other participant. The choice that is picked out, whether it is yours or that of the other 
participant, will determine how much you will actually earn in this part of the experiment. 
 
Also this time, you must not be afraid to make a mistake when you are making your choices. 
As in part I, you will immediately see what you have chosen and will be asked if this is ok, 
and when you have made all your choices you will get an overview of all the situations. If 
there are any choices that you are not happy with, you may do them again – if you are happy 
with all your choices, you confirm them. 
 
And, remember, you can always raise your hand and we will come and assist you. 
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When you have confirmed your choices in part II, you will be asked a few questions. You 
have not completed part II until you have answered these questions and the following page 
has come up. 
 
Screen Shot 8 
 
You have now completed part II of the experiment 
Wait for new instructions. 
 
 
When you have come this far, please sit quietly and wait until everyone else has also reached 
this page. 
 
We now have to wait a little while for the computer that controls the experiment and both 
rooms to be ready to start with the division. 
 
We are now ready to start with the division. You will now see how many points you have to 
divide. When you have finished looking at this, you continue and start by making your first 
choice. Remember to raise your hand if you need help. And remember to continue right until 
you reach the screen shot that shows that you have completed the second part of the 
experiment. 
 
When you have finished, please sit quietly and wait for everyone in both rooms to be finished. 
 
Now, everyone has done a good job and has completed part II of the experiment. 
 
You will soon see a page that tells you how much you have earned in each part of the 
experiment. Here I will show you an example of such a page: 
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Screen shot 9 
How much did you earn? 
Part I 
One of the other player’s choices was picked out. 
You earned 150 kroner, the other player earned 0 kroner. 
 
Part II 
One of the other player’s choices was picked out. 
You earned 1200 kroner, the other player earned 0 kroner. 
 
In addition you receive 50 kroner for participating in the experiment. 
You receive a total of 1400 kroner. 
The amount will be transferred to your bank account. 
 
In both parts of the experiment the computer has randomly picked out one of the situations 
you were in, and either your choice or the choice of the other player to decide how much you 
are going to earn. 
 
• Here you can see how much you earned in part I and part II 
• In addition you receive 50 kroner for participating in the experiment 
• Here you can see your total earnings 
 
You now have to wait while the computer prepares the payment page. Please face the screen 
while you are waiting. 
 
The payment page has now come up. Everyone must sit quietly while looking at this page. 
 
You will now receive an envelope that you must look after very carefully. In the envelope 
there is a form which contains a code that shows which computer you have been using. This 
code will be forwarded to the school’s finance department. When the form is returned to the 
school’s finance department together with a bank account number, then the money you have 
earned will be transferred to this bank account number. 
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If you lose the envelope or do not return it to us with a bank account number, we will not be 
able to transfer the money to you. So you must bring it home, fill in the form and send the 
envelope back to us as soon as possible. The money you have earned will then be transferred 
to the bank account number that we have been given. 
Please remain seated until everyone has received their envelope. 
 
Finally, we would like to thank everyone for participating in the experiment and for doing 
such a good job. There is one more important thing that we need to tell you about. We will be 
carrying out this experiment with more pupils this week, including pupils from your school. It 
is very important to us that these pupils do not know what is going to happen. We therefore 
ask you not to talk to anyone about the experiment or tell anyone how much you have earned 
before the week is over. You may of course talk to those you have been with here today and 
to your parents, but not to anyone else. You must not talk about this to your siblings either, as 
they themselves may be taking part in the experiment or they may know someone who is 
going to take part. If you talk about this to others, you may ruin the whole research 
experiment for us. So this is a very important message which we hope you will respect. Next 
week you may of course talk to whoever you like about it, and there will then also be an 
article about it in the newspapers. 
 
Now it is time for something to eat and in the meantime we will also tell you a little bit about 
what you have participated in today and about our school.  You may now follow our assistant. 
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COMPLETE OVERVIEW OF SCREEN SHOTS – EXPERIMENT 
Welcome to the experiment 
Please remain seated and wait for instructions. 
 
Task 
Find all the places where the number 826 appears in the table. 
Click in the box on the right-hand side of these numbers. 
You earn one point for each correct number 
You lose one point for each wrong number 
When you wish to continue to the next task, click the submit button underneath the table. 
SUBMIT 
 
Time is up! 
Wait for instructions. 
 
Result: 
• You worked with the task for 32 minutes 
• You earned 250 points 
• Were unlucky and earned 0.20 kroner for each point 
Your points are worth 50 kroner. 
Press the button to continue. 
CONTINUE 
 15
 
Choice 1/5 
You and another player have together earned 170 kroner 
How much of this do you wish to give to yourself?  SUBMIT 
(The amount will be rounded off to the nearest 10 kroner.) 
How did you earn the money? 
 
YOU     THE OTHER PLAYER 
• Worked for 32 minutes  Worked for 36 minutes 
• Earned 250 points   Earned 300 points 
• Were unlucky (20 øre per point) Were lucky (40 øre per point) 
• Earned 50 kroner   Earned 120 kroner 
 
 
 
Confirmation 
Choice 1/5 
You and another player have together earned 170 kroner 
You chose to keep xxx kroner 
This means that the other player gets xxx kroner 
How did you earn the money? 
 
YOU     THE OTHER PLAYER 
• Worked for 32 minutes  Worked for 36 minutes 
• Earned 250 points   Earned 300 points 
• Were unlucky (20 øre per point) Were lucky (40 øre per point) 
• Earned 50 kroner   Earned 120 kroner 
 
Press the button to confirm your choice or tray again 
CONFIRM CHOICE 
TRY AGAIN 
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Are your choices ok? 
You will now see your choices again 
If you think they are ok, press ALL OK. 
If you want to change any of your choices, tick off and press CHANGE 
GO TO OVERVIEW 
 
Overview of your choices 
Below is an overview of your choices 
ALL OK 
CHANGE 
Choice 
Choice 1/5 
You and another player have together earned 170 kroner 
You chose to keep xxx kroner. 
This means that the other player gets xxx kroner. 
How did you earn the money? 
YOU     THE OTHER PLAYER 
• Worked for 32 minutes  Worked for 36 minutes 
• Earned 250 points   Earned 300 points 
• Were unlucky (20 øre per point) Were lucky (40 øre per point) 
• Earned 50 kroner   Earned 120 kroner 
 
You have now completed the first part of the experiment 
Wait for new instructions. 
 
Part II 
We give you 100 points to share between yourself and another player. 
Press the button to make your first choice. 
CONTINUE 
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Choice 1/4 
You have received 100 points 
How many points do you wish to give to yourself?                       SUBMIT 
(Your choice will be rounded off to the nearest 10 points) 
YOU     THE OTHER PLAYER 
Each point is worth 1 krone  Each point is worth 4 kroner 
 
Confirmation 1/4 
You have received 100 points 
You chose to keep xxx points for yourself. This means that you get xxx kroner (since each 
point is worth 1 krone) 
You chose to give xxx points to the other player. This means that he or she gets xxx kroner 
(since each point is worth 4 kroner to him or her). 
Press the button to confirm your choice or tray again 
CONFIRM CHOICE 
TRY AGAIN 
 
Are your choices in part II ok? 
You will now see your choices again 
If you think they are ok, press ALL OK. 
If you want to change any of your choices, tick off and press CHANGE 
GO TO OVERVIEW 
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Overview of your choices 
Below is an overview of your choices 
ALL OK 
CHANGE 
Choice 
Choice 1/4 
You have received 100 points 
You chose to keep xxx points for yourself. This means that you get xxx kroner. 
The other player gets xxx kroner. 
 
YOU     THE OTHER PLAYER 
Each point is worth 1 krone  Each point is worth 4 kroner 
 
A few questions: 
Before we finish we would like you to answer a few questions: 
1. 
Are you a boy or a girl? 
Boy  
Girl 
 
2. 
Imagine two secretaries who are both the same age and are both doing the same job. One of 
them finds out that the other earns a lot more than she does. The best paid secretary is better at 
her job in many ways. Do you think it is fair or unfair that one secretary earns more than the 
other? 
Fair 
Unfair 
 
3. 
Choose a point on the scale below: 
Those who work hard   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Hard work does not help, it is luck 
normally have a better life    and connections that are important 
SUBMIT ANSWER 
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You have now completed the second part of the experiment 
Wait for new instructions. 
 
How much did you earn? 
Part I 
One of the other player’s choices was picked out. 
You earned 70 kroner, the other player earned 100 kroner. 
Part II 
One of the other player’s choices was picked out. 
You earned 80 kroner, the other player earned 60 kroner. 
You also get 50 kroner for participating. 
All in all you get 200 kroner. 
The amount will be transferred to the bank account that you enter in the form. 
Please remain seated until you are given new instructions. 
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. 
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